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design, drift, and decoupling at the UN Security Council
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WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Abstract Despite ubiquitous calls for their reform, international organizations (IOs) 
often suffer from legitimacy deficits. What explains the emergence of legitimacy deficits 
and what effects do they produce? This article discusses the gradual emergence of 
legitimacy deficits through the concept of legitimacy drift. Legitimacy drift occurs when 
an organization loses legitimacy by failing to adapt itself to a changing environment. 
It identifies three sources of legitimacy drift: failure to live up to pre-existing standards 
(broken promises), changes in the standards of legitimacy by which organizations are 
assessed (shifting standards), and changes in an organization’s relevant public (audience 
shift). Legitimacy deficits typically prompt organizational responses. These include 
attempts at re-legitimation through institutional reform and operational adaptation, but 
also other ‘coping mechanisms’ such as promises of reform, the logic of confidence, and 
decoupling. Coping mechanisms are especially important where reform is blocked. This 
model is illustrated by the history of the United Nations Security Council, one of the 
oldest and most powerful IOs. A conclusion calls for bridging historical and sociological 
institutionalism to better understand IO legitimacy in time.
Introduction
Since the Second World War, international politics has seen an explosion in the 
number of international organizations (IOs). While new IOs continue to be cre-
ated, the demography of IOs is also changing. The oldest extant IO is already 
more than two centuries old,1 and while it is clearly an outlier, the IO population 
continues to age. Of a recent stratified random sample of 50 IOs, the average age 
is forty-five years (Tallberg et al. 2014). At a time of rapid changes in the interna-
tional environment, IOs are becoming increasing aged (Heiskanen 2001, 1).
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Take, for example, the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Few countries 
are enthusiastic about the institutional design and procedures of the Security 
Council, and many question its legitimacy. Countries often avoid its formal pro-
cedures in favour of informal consultations and other flexibilities in its working 
methods. Its institutionalization of great power hierarchy conflicts with modern 
norms of sovereign equality and democratic decision-making. By all accounts, it 
is an anachronism. Yet it remains central to the international political and legal 
order, and states persist in seeking its reform, as they have done for decades. It 
suffers from a chronic legitimacy deficit (Binder and Heupel 2015; Blum 2005; 
Franck 2006; Hurd 2007).
To existing theories of international institutional legitimacy, IOs with persis-
tent legitimacy deficits are, at first sight, puzzling.2 States are said to favour acting 
through multilateral institutions as a means of garnering legitimacy, giving them 
an interest in ensuring that institutions retain this legitimating function (Claude 
1966). Moreover, a lack of legitimacy must be compensated by increased material 
inducements or coercive imposition, which increases an institution’s operating 
costs (Hurd 1999). Legitimacy deficits are seen as weakening the ‘compliance pull’ 
(Franck 1990, 24) of institutions, which in turn imperils the gains that suppos-
edly flow from international cooperation. In extreme cases, members may simply 
abandon an illegitimate institution. If one assumes that states are able to ration-
ally design institutions in accordance with their wishes (Koremenos, Lipson, and 
Snidal 2001), why is the legitimacy of so many IOs deeply contested, and why do 
they seem incapable of undertaking commensurate reforms?
This article addresses this puzzle by developing the concept of legitimacy 
drift. To do so, it adopts a longitudinal perspective on institutional development 
and combines the insights of rival institutionalist theories. First, in contrast to 
strict interpretations of rational choice institutionalism, this article conceives of 
legitimacy as having an important role in institutional design—legitimacy consid-
erations are never far from the minds of those who design and set up IOs. Second, 
it develops the concept of legitimacy drift to conceptualize the legitimacy deficits 
that emerge when an institution stays the same but its normative and political 
environment changes. The article identifies three sources of legitimacy drift: fail-
ure to live up to pre-existing standards (broken promises), changes in the stand-
ards of legitimacy by which it is assessed (shifting standards), and changes in an 
organization’s relevant public (audience shift). As the population of IOs continues 
to age, fertile ground for legitimacy drift to take hold has emerged. Third, the 
article posits that responses to legitimacy drift on the part of IOs include not only 
re-legitimation through institutional reform and operational adaptation, but also 
diverse coping mechanisms, such as promises of reform, the logic of confidence, 
and decoupling. Coping mechanisms are especially likely where reform is blocked 
due to vested interests or institutional lock-in.
In developing this model, the article draws on concepts from historical insti-
tutionalism, a research tradition deeply familiar with the weight of history and 
institutional inefficiencies, but which has until now neglected the problem of 
 2 IOs are defined here as formal institutions, consisting primarily of state members, with explicit 
rules, assignment of roles and a capacity for action (Keohane 1988).
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institutional legitimacy.3 Moreover, in line with sociological institutionalism, the 
model emphasizes the role of legitimacy for institutional development, and organ-
izational responses to legitimacy deficits.4 Theorists from international relations 
and international law have excelled at exploring the interrelationship of power 
and legitimacy as they manifest in international institutions (Clark 2005; Claude 
1966; Franck 1990; Hurd 2002; Ikenberry 2001; Johnstone 2003; Reus-Smit 2007), 
but they have not yet utilized the analytical categories or explanatory accounts 
offered by institutionalist theory. This article aims to bridge these theoretical 
approaches while highlighting the ways in which rival institutionalisms can com-
plement rather than compete with one another. By avoiding strong claims about 
the logics of practice or deep socialization, it endeavours to side-step claims of 
ontological incommensurability (Buhari-Gulmez 2010, 263), and rather build on 
the assumption that goals-oriented actors operate in a social environment consti-
tuted by power-plays and economic gains-seeking as well as the pursuit of social 
approval and normative legitimacy (Dimaggio and Powell 1991, 33; Hanrieder 
2015; Nielson, Tierney, and Weaver 2006).
In a second step, this article illustrates the theoretical model of legitimacy drift 
via the case of the Security Council. The model of legitimacy drift—categories 
describing its origins and its effects—helps to explain why the Council has such 
precarious legitimacy and how it has coped with its persistent legitimacy defi-
cit. The case study draws on secondary literature and a range of primary UN 
documents recording speeches made in intergovernmental debates at important 
moments in the Council’s history in the 1940s, 1960s, and mid 2000s. The debates 
in the 1940s relate to the Council’s ‘founding moment’ and come from the first 
sitting of the General Assembly in Central Hall, Westminster, London, in Janu-
ary 1946. The second emerge from the mid-1960s, when the number of rotating 
members of the Council was expanded from six to ten. The debates in the 2000s 
occurred at the height of reform debates in the mid-2000s. The General Assembly, 
rather than the Council, is chosen as the appropriate source material as it remains 
the primary legitimacy constituency in whose eyes the Council appeals for legit-
imacy. The material illustrates the three sources of legitimacy drift developed in 
the model: the Council’s capacity to deliver on its original criteria for legitimacy 
has eroded (broken promises); over time, it has become subject to a different rep-
ertoire of legitimacy demands (shifting standards); and its relevant public has 
changed due to the expansion in UN membership (audience shift). The absence 
of re-legitimation of the Council through formal reform has led to different cop-
ing mechanisms such as adaptations of its working methods, promises of reform, 
public relations initiatives, and decoupling.
The first section of this article presents the concepts of legitimacy and legiti-
macy drift, elucidates legitimacy drift’s three sources, and discusses institutional 
responses. The second section empirically assesses the model’s plausibility in the 
case of the Security Council. Finally, a conclusion summarizes the findings and 
 3 For example, in several recent statements of historical institutionalist scholarship, the concept 
of legitimacy is almost totally absent (Fioretos 2011; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Rixen, Viola, and Zürn 
2016; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). A rare exception is Hanrieder and Zürn (2017).
 4 Nonetheless, it also assumes that IOs are created by ends-oriented—if legitimacy-aware—actors, 
which is arguably consistent with a modified version of rational choice institutionalism (Koremenos et 
al. 2001; March and Olsen 1998).
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suggests implications for legitimacy research and institutional theory in relation 
to IOs.
1. The Legitimacy of International Organizations in Time
While IOs have traditionally been understood in power-based or functionalist 
terms, a burgeoning body of scholarship has recognized the significance of legit-
imacy for IOs and other international institutions (Bexell 2014; Brassett and Tsi-
ngou 2011; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Coicaud and Heiskanen 2001; Grigorescu 
2015; Symons 2011; Zaum 2013b; Zürn 2004). The legitimacy of an institution con-
sists of the degree to which its relevant public generally regards its features and 
behaviour as desirable, correct or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Franck 1990, 24; Hurd 1999, 381; 
Reus-Smit 2007, 159; Suchman 1995, 574; Zaum 2013a, 9).5 Because an IO’s basic 
structures and principles must resonate with social beliefs in order to be perceived 
as legitimate, its legitimacy is bound to the perceptions and beliefs of its internal 
participants and external constituents (Hurd 1999, 387–88; Zaum 2013a, 9; Zürn 
and Stephen 2010, 95).
Legitimacy, by definition, cannot be achieved through coercion, but legitimacy 
is deeply related to power. While classical realists emphasized legitimacy as an 
instrument of state power (Carr 1946, 132–45; Morgenthau 1948, 32), more recent 
scholarship has focused on the dialectic between power and legitimacy. While 
legitimate power is more effective than illegitimate power, legitimacy is depend-
ent on recognition, and can be withheld when the exercise of power becomes too 
blatant—the requirements of legitimacy both enable and constrain power hold-
ers (Clark 2005; Claude 1966; Franck 1990; Hurd 2002; Ikenberry 2001; Johnstone 
2003; Reus-Smit 2007). International organizations too are made more powerful 
when they have legitimacy, but they need to conform to the demands of their 
audiences to retain it (Clark 2011, 150–54; Cox 1983, 172–73; Hurd 2007, 128–31; 
Ikenberry 2001, 10; Zaum 2013a, 19–22).
Within the sociological tradition, the legitimacy of international institutions is 
seen to derive from various sources. Legitimacy is often parsed into procedural, 
performance-based, and norm- or law-based sources (eg Binder and Heupel 2015, 
240–42; Franck 1990, 16–18). Procedural legitimacy accrues to an institution by 
following widely recognized rules of decision-making (Franck 1990). Perfor-
mance-based legitimacy derives from an institution’s delivering on its mandate 
or being guided by recognized expertise (Lake 2009a; Zürn, Binder, and Eck-
er-Ehrhardt 2012). These two elements of institutional legitimacy are sometimes 
simplified into the two categories of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy (Scharpf 
1999, 2003). Additionally, norm- and law-based legitimacy emerges from acting 
 5  Following the empirical–sociological tradition, in this paper an institution is taken to be 
‘legitimate’ quite simply when its subjects believe it to be so—what Beetham calls legitimacy ‘for a 
social scientist’ (1991, 6). A legitimate institution in this sense may be good or bad from one’s own 
normative point of view. For this distinction, see also Buchanan and Keohane (2006), Clark (2005, 
18), and Steffek (2003, 253–54). It must be acknowledged, however, that some are sceptical of a neat 
separation between normative and sociological approaches to legitimacy (Beetham 1991, 11; Hurrell 
2002; Zaum 2013a, 10).
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in accordance with established, often law-based, norms (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004; Clark 2005, 18; Steffek 2003, 251).6
While these dimensions of legitimacy are widely recognized, no consensus on 
the ‘correct’ criteria for legitimacy in global governance yet exists (Bernstein 2011, 
22). As Franck (1990, 18) explains, legitimacy is in fact ‘a bracketing of many inte-
gral factors, which are related but different and which must be investigated by 
reference to different social data.’ Rather than make strong a priori claims about 
the correct sources of legitimacy, adopting a sociological approach suggests that 
the question of which elements of legitimacy are most important for an institution 
ultimately depends on the beliefs and perceptions of its relevant public. These can 
change over time. Publics are unlikely to speak with one voice either. What makes 
an institution legitimate in practice is ultimately an empirical question.
While global governance scholarship has already explored these dimensions 
of IO legitimacy in recent years, with a few notable exceptions,7 scholars have 
accorded less explicit attention to changing patterns of legitimacy over time. 
Moreover, institutional ‘coping mechanisms’ that emerge under the conditions of 
a legitimacy deficit—often emphasized in sociological institutionalism—remain 
underexplored. Attention to legitimacy ‘crises’ (Morris and Wheeler 2007; Reus-
Smit 2007; Seabrooke 2007) may also distract from the incremental emergence of 
persistent legitimacy deficits. These considerations call for ways of conceptualiz-
ing how institutional legitimacy deficits can emerge gradually over time.
Legitimacy by Design
When creating IOs, state representatives seek not only to achieve certain instru-
mental objectives, but also to achieve institutional legitimacy (Fehl 2004; Hurd 
2007, 4; Wendt 2001, 1025–27). This imposes limits on the range of ‘rational’ choices 
available and is a neglected dimension of institutional design (Wendt 2001, 1039). 
Just as questions of institutional design (Koremenos et al. 2001) and purpose are 
up for negotiation during founding moments, so are considerations of how to 
render the institution legitimate. It is difficult, for example to explain the goal of 
universal membership in many international agreements without acknowledging 
the legitimacy dividend that emerges from this inclusiveness. Likewise, the selec-
tion of ‘one-state, one-vote’ decision-making rules for most IOs is hard to explain 
without considering the assumed fairness of such procedures (Wendt 2001, 1025). 
Legitimacy needs may even (partly) explain the creation of some IOs. For example, 
Fehl (2004, 374–75) has argued that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was set 
up in part to remedy the deficient legitimacy of ad hoc UN tribunals. The bottom 
line is this: Designers of IOs have an interest not just in establishing institutions to 
serve particular functional purposes, but also in ensuring that they are perceived 
as legitimate, at least by those with the capacity to undermine their activities.
The design phase of an IO typically takes place within ‘founding moments’, 
which historical institutionalists suggest are deeply significant in shaping an 
 institution’s future trajectory (Fioretos 2011, 369). This is because such moments 
 6 For other categorizations, with special reference to IOs, see (Bernstein 2011; Bexell 2014; Haas 
2017; Hurrelmann, Schneider, and Steffek 2007; Schmidt 2013; Suchman 1995; Zaum 2013a; Zürn 2017; 
Zürn and Stephen 2010).
 7 See Clark (2005), Grigorescu (2015).
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constitute critical junctures that temporarily open up possibilities for contingency 
and institutional innovation (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). From a macro-histor-
ical perspective, these founding moments are associated with the aftermaths of 
great power conflicts (Clark 2005; Ikenberry 2001), but the same logic applies at 
each instance of institutional creation. Legitimacy will always be imperfect, but 
the flexibilities available during founding moments provide creators more free-
dom to accommodate legitimacy demands into the design of an institution than 
would be available in an already-institutionalized status quo. Especially when 
institutions are created with strong status quo coalitions or veto players, the deci-
sions reached during founding moments can persist long into the future, setting 
institutions ‘on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter’ (Pierson 
2004, 125). Since legitimacy depends on the beliefs of a relevant public, it follows 
that an institution’s legitimacy must be related to the beliefs prevalent during 
these critical junctures.
Legitimacy Drift
The concept of legitimacy drift stems from the observation that international insti-
tutions often encounter challenges to their legitimacy as a result of the aging pro-
cess (Franck 1970; Heiskanen 2001, 1–2; Zaum 2013a, 7). After their creation, IOs 
become embedded in changing environments to which they may not perfectly 
adapt (March and Olsen 1998, 954–56). In other words, ‘rates of environmental 
change frequently outpace rates of organizational adaptation’ (Dimaggio and 
Powell 1991, 33). As a consequence, IOs have a tendency to become less efficient or 
effective than a purely functionalist approach would suggest. While familiar also 
to sociological institutionalists, the historical institutionalist concept of ‘institu-
tional drift’ is one way to capture this mode of incremental change. This describes 
a process in which an institution remains the same while its impact changes or 
becomes less effective due to shifts in the broader environment (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010, 17; Streeck and Thelen 2005, 24–26). Legitimacy too must be continu-
ally maintained (Suchman 1995, 593–94). When legitimacy maintenance does not 
result in synchronous adaptions to new demands, an institution’s legitimacy may 
thus be undermined, producing legitimacy drift. This refers to a situation in which 
an institution does not adapt to a changing political and normative environment, 
leading to a decline in its perceived legitimacy.8
Legitimacy drift is a process that gives rise to the outcome of a legitimacy deficit.9 
Institutional legitimacy can increase or decrease according to the extent to which 
an institution meets the criteria for legitimacy in the eyes of its relevant public. 
This article recognizes three sources of legitimacy drift, (1) disruption in percep-
tions of whether an institution meets existing standards of legitimacy (broken 
promises), (2) changes in the standards or criteria for legitimacy applied to an insti-
tution (shifting standards), and (3) changes in an institution’s relevant public (audi-
ence shift). Each of these three sources of legitimacy drift can erode the  procedural, 
 8  Note that while legitimacy drift designates cases of reduced institutional legitimacy, it may 
be possible—although intuitively unlikely—that exogenous changes serve to reinforce institutional 
legitimacy. Such cases could be described as legitimacy consolidation.
 9 Drift thus describes a form of change that emerges from an endogenous factor (institutional 
stasis) combined with an exogenous factor (a changing environment).
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performance-based, or norm- or law-based sources of legitimacy upon which IOs 
are based. These three sources of legitimacy drift are comprehensive, yet they are 
meant to be abstract categories—their specific meaning or substance needs to be 
fleshed out in light of concrete cases. They can each be applied to any dimension 
of an institution’s legitimacy. While sometimes hard to separate empirically, these 
processes are analytically separate and clarify the mechanisms that generate legit-
imacy drift.
Broken promises: One source of legitimacy drift occurs when an IO’s audience 
perceives it as no longer meeting the standards of legitimacy originally applied 
to it. When an organization is perceived as not living up to its prior standards 
for legitimacy, it is seen as breaking its promises. Promise breaking can hurt any 
dimension of an institution’s legitimacy. On the input side, David Beetham has 
discussed the example of declining proportionality in the British parliament—its 
first-past-the-post voting system has resulted in a loss of legitimacy as the system 
has exhibited an increased tendency to produce national parliaments divergent 
from the proportion of votes cast. This loss in legitimacy did not result from peo-
ple’s changing beliefs, but from the diminished ability of an institution to deliver 
on its existing criteria of legitimacy (Beetham 1991, 11–12). Similarly, if the legiti-
macy of an institution such as the Security Council is predicated on representing 
the countries of principal industrial and military strength, the emergence of new 
major powers outside the institution will lead to a decline in this aspect of its 
legitimacy. Regarding output, if an IO’s legitimacy was originally predicated on 
its ability to provide public goods (a form of performance legitimacy), a decline 
in its capacity to provide these goods is likely to erode its legitimacy. For some 
observers, the perceived lack of efficacy of the World Trade Organization as a site 
for negotiated trade liberalization has led to a decline in its original claim to legit-
imacy. Broken promises thus refer to the decline of an institution’s capacity to live 
up to its initial criteria for legitimacy.
Shifting standards: An institution may or may not live up to its original con-
ditions for its legitimacy; however, the conditions of legitimacy that are applied 
to an IO by its relevant public may also change. Martha Finnemore has explored 
how internationally held norms and values change over time (Finnemore 1996, 2), 
and Ian Clark has explored how legitimacy’s content changes over time in co-evo-
lution with a changing international society (Clark 2005, 13). Shifting standards 
refers to the situation that occurs when normative change alters the criteria for 
institutional legitimacy and consequently erodes an institution’s legitimacy. Fail-
ure to adapt to these ‘shifting standards’ is another source of legitimacy drift. For 
example, some institutions have been formerly evaluated primarily according to 
output-oriented, technocratic standards of legitimacy. Over time, however, new 
demands for transparency or representation may join this technocratic justifica-
tion (Zürn and Stephen 2010, 96). Alternatively, an institution’s entire mandate 
may change, requiring an overhaul of an institution’s claims to legitimacy. This 
occurred, for example, to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1970s 
with the shift to floating exchange rates (Krueger 2006). Shifting standards may 
also be a question of extent, in which case a previously minor legitimacy criterion 
becomes more important over time. The importance of giving a voice to transna-
tional societal actors may have increased over time, for example, gradually chal-
lenging the legitimacy of relatively ‘closed’ intergovernmental IOs (Tallberg and 
Jönsson 2010).
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Audience shift: Finally, an institution can be exposed to new legitimacy demands 
through a change in its relevant public (or legitimacy constituency). The link between 
power and legitimacy is particularly obvious when it comes to defining an institu-
tion’s relevant public, as some actors’ legitimacy perceptions clearly matter more 
than others’ (Symons 2011, 2558). Most IOs’ primary audiences will be their mem-
ber states, yet an institution’s relevant public can potentially widen to include 
secondary audiences, such as non-member states, domestic publics, NGOs, or 
other transnational actors. Moreover, IOs may become reliant on these secondary 
audiences to achieve their goals. This growing reliance constitutes audience shift 
through an expansion of an IO’s relevant public. In these cases, an institution may 
remain legitimate in the eyes of its founding members, but still lose legitimacy 
(Symons 2011, 2562). This can occur, for example, through the accession of states 
as new members of an IO. New members of an IO’s relevant public may in addi-
tion hold different ideas about what makes an institution legitimate, which may 
contribute to shifting standards. Yet audience shift can also have an immediate 
effect in cases where an institution is thought to require participation or represent-
ative legitimacy—in such cases, the addition of new members without changes in 
the procedures by which interests are aggregated and represented may ipso facto 
erode its representative legitimacy. Among IOs’ member states, however, there is 
unlikely to be a consensus on the sources of legitimacy germane to the institution; 
moreover, the Janus-faced nature of IOs as both corporate agents and platforms 
for their memberships complicates the directionality of legitimation (Zaum 2013a, 
13–22). As Christian Reus-Smit (2007, 164) has argued, ‘The question of which 
constituency an actor must establish legitimacy in can be answered only with ref-
erence to the political realm in which he or she seeks to act’. Since this political 
realm is unlikely to remain static over time, institutions will need to recalibrate 
their legitimacy as their relevant publics evolve. Such cases of audience shift are 
likely to give rise to calls for institutional reform to keep an IO in line with external 
developments.
These three sources of legitimacy drift—broken promises, shifting standards, 
and audience shift—all generate the potential for eroded institutional legitimacy. 
While these processes often interact, they can also vary independently of one 
another. An institution’s legitimacy can be undermined through audience shift, 
even if it continues to perform well according to previously established criteria. 
Alternatively, shifting standards of legitimacy can lead to new challenges for insti-
tutional legitimacy, even if the relevant public remains unchanged. Or an IO’s 
legitimacy may erode simply because it becomes less able to fulfil the legitimacy 
demands originally made of it, and so on.
Organizational Responses
International organizations can respond in a number of ways to legitimacy defi-
cits. A response exists when an organization changes its structure or behaviour in 
response to legitimacy demands. Each of the responses can be applied to amelio-
rate any element of an IO’s eroded legitimacy.
The most straight-forward forms of organizational responses to legitimacy 
drift are re-legitimation through institutional reform and operational adaptation. These 
responses entail changing formal structures or actual practices to adapt in line 
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with ‘collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner’ (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977, 349). In response to audience shift, for example, institutional 
reforms that integrate new members into an IO’s activities could recalibrate an 
institution’s design with its new public. Legitimacy erosion could be addressed 
through compensatory reforms that bolster an IO’s performance in weak areas, or 
through meeting increased expectations in a particular area of performance (out-
put legitimacy). Shifting standards may require more fundamental reforms, such 
as changing an IO’s mandate to cover new areas or changing its decision-making 
procedures in accordance with new ideas of legitimate procedures.
Re-legitimation through reform and operational adaptation are, however, not 
always viable responses to legitimacy drift (Bromley and Powell 2012; Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, 356–59; Oliver 1991). Unlike founding legitimacy, legitimacy repair is 
a reactive process, often coming late, and encountering encrusted organizational 
obstacles (Suchman 1995, 597). Reform of IOs also involves navigating powerful 
vested interests and built-in constraints (Hanrieder 2015). To address this, some 
institutions have been designed with provisions for future ‘updates’ already in 
mind. But these provisions are often stymied in practice. For example, the IMF 
provides for quinquennial revisions of its weighted voting structure. But obstruc-
tion tactics enabled by qualified majority voting rules tend to hinder this updating 
in practice (Vestergaard and Wade 2015). The International Labour Organization 
has been relatively more successful in expanding the size of its Governing Body, 
but has still fallen short of implementing constitutional reform.10 Reform can also 
be prevented due to problematic features of legitimacy concerns themselves. 
Where legitimacy demands are conflicting or even contradictory, re-legitimation 
finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. In such cases, new legitimacy demands may 
be internally inconsistent, rendering reform strategies indeterminate (Oliver 1991, 
162; Rasche and Gilbert 2015, 246; Suchman 1995, 594).
Persistent legitimacy deficits combined with institutional inertia are more 
likely to call forth ‘coping mechanisms’ such as public relations initiatives, prom-
ises of reform, the logic of confidence and good faith, and decoupling (Meyer 
2009, 51; Meyer and Rowan 1977, 356).11 Public relations initiatives involve legiti-
macy-enhancing communications or expressing commitment to legitimate norms 
(‘impression management’) (Allen and Caillouet 1994; Bansal and Clelland 2004; 
Ecker-Ehrhardt 2017). While promises of reform in the future may also mollify 
critics, they come at the price of conceding illegitimacy today (Meyer and Rowan 
1977, 356). But in the case of IOs whose primary legitimacy constituency remains 
their state members, experienced diplomats are likely to see through simple win-
dow-dressing efforts.
Persistent legitimacy deficits of IOs may be alleviated more substantially 
by what sociological institutionalists know as decoupling and the related logic of 
 confidence and good faith (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 356–59). In contrast to institu-
tional reform or meaningful operational adaptation, these responses to legitimacy 
10 An Instrument of Amendment to the ILO Constitution was adopted in 1986 which would greatly 
expand membership in the Governing Body and abolish permanent seats. However, it has failed to 
gather the ratifications necessary to come into effect (two-thirds of the ILO member states and at least 
five of the ten states with permanent seats) (International Labour Organization 2017).
11  This list of alternative organizational responses to legitimacy deficits is not designed to be 
exhaustive but to include the most salient categories as represented in sociological institutionalism. 
For an elaboration see Pache and Santos (2010).
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deficits are ceremonial rather than substantive (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 
2016). Both options appear more likely when reform paths to re-legitimation are 
blocked.
Decoupling has been observed in many organizations (Bromley and Powell 
2012; Dick 2015; Maclean and Behnam 2010; Oliver 1991; Rasche and Gilbert 2015), 
but is still curiously absent from literature on IOs (but see importantly Kentike-
lenis et al. 2016). It refers to the gaps that tend to emerge between institutions’ 
structures, policies, and practices, and is seen most vividly in the ‘famous gaps 
between norms and behavior’ (Meyer 2009, 50). Since satisfying all members of a 
legitimacy audience is often difficult, institutions often practice a certain level of 
hypocrisy (Brunsson 1989). Decoupling enables organizations to seek the legiti-
macy from adaptation to normative criteria while failing to meet them in practice 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008, 79; Meyer and Rowan 1977, 357). Decoupling is 
traditionally seen to proceed by rendering formal structures in line with legit-
imacy requirements but continuing organizational practices unchanged. While 
decoupling may be less preferable than institutional reform for relegitimating an 
IO, in an imperfect world it may play an important role in reconciling legitimacy 
drift with institutional stability.
Relatedly, the logic of confidence suggests how internal participants and exter-
nal constituents can collude in avoiding, being discreet about, or overlooking 
glaring departures from normatively mandated structures or practices (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977, 358). Thus, rhetorical practices of hypocrisy, euphemizing, and 
indirect speech can be deployed by those seeking to preserve an institution’s 
legitimacy (Bourdieu 1977; Brunsson 1989; Finnemore 2009; Stephen 2015). These 
forms of rhetorical decoupling enable speakers to bridge the gap between nor-
mative rhetoric and political reality. These discursive practices may not be sus-
tainable in the longer-term, either because actors’ preferences converge with their 
espoused beliefs in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Dutton and Dukerich 
1991), or because outside critics expose decoupling and denounce it as hypocrisy 
(Finnemore 2009). Alternatively, it may persist as a more or less regularized way 
of mediating normative and functional or interest-based demands while saving 
face (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 358; Stephen 2015, 773). Table 1 summarizes these 
categories of legitimacy drift and institutional responses.
The next section applies this model of legitimacy drift and its organizational 
responses to the case of the Security Council. The section begins by examining the 
standards of legitimacy that underpinned the Security Council in the eyes of UN 
Members at its founding moment and during its earliest months of operation. It 
Table 1. Legitimacy Drift and Organizational Responses






Audience shift Logic of confidence (pretending, saving face) 
Promises of reform
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then examines subsequent changes in the political and normative environment 
that combined with institutional stasis to create legitimacy drift. Decolonization 
and its resulting additional UN membership resulted in audience shift, the Cold 
War and later power shifts led to legitimacy erosion, and the delegitimation of sov-
ereign inequalities generated shifting standards. This section then shows how the 
resulting legitimacy deficit prompted (until now unsuccessful) attempts at insti-
tutional reform, leading to promises of reform, decoupling and the logic of confi-
dence.
2. The Legitimacy of the Security Council in Time
The institutional design of the Council began as the Second World War drew to a 
close—a critical juncture in which powerful states could redraw the institutions of 
world politics with few constraints. As in prior great conflicts, the victors of war 
were able to shape the parameters of international legitimacy, but they did so in 
a way that drew to an unprecedented degree on international institutions (Clark 
2011, 123–46; Cox 1987, 211–67; Ikenberry 2001, 146–214). Initially sketched out by 
American and British policy planners, the basic design for a new IO to replace the 
League of Nations solidified during the ‘Dumbarton Oaks Conversations’ from 
August to October 1944. The war context and the limited number of participants 
gave the negotiators unparalleled flexibility to set the terms of the new organiza-
tion (Bosco 2009; Hildebrand 1990; Hurd 2007).
While most UN organs were based on one-state, one-vote voting procedures, 
the Security Council granted special rights and responsibilities to its five perma-
nent veto-wielding members (the P5).12 The Council would embody Roosevelt’s 
idea for a ‘trusteeship of the powerful’, whose institutional design would be the 
result of hard bargaining among the ‘Big Three’ wartime allies of the United 
States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The results of these negotiations—
incorporating the Republic of China in the second part of the Dumbarton Oaks 
conference, and resulting in the addition of France as a final permanent member—
would then be presented for approval to the other wartime allies at the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 1945. Hier-
archy was not new to international society at this time (Keene 2007; Lake 2009b), 
but the Security Council institutionalized it to a new degree. To this day, the veto 
remains glaringly inconsistent with the norm of sovereign equality in the UN 
system. Moreover, this departure from the norm and legal principle of sovereign 
equality appears to conflict with the UN’s own commitment to the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its members. How was this institution legitimated at this 
founding moment?13
12  The question of voting procedures was deferred until agreement was announced at Yalta in 
February 1945. See United Nations (1947:9).
13 The legitimacy of the Security Council is made more complicated in that the Council is both 
an autonomous body and an intergovernmental forum (Welsh and Zaum 2013:67). To some extent, 
Council legitimacy is a reflection of the members that make it up, yet there are good reasons for 
treating the Council as an autonomous organization for legitimation purposes. The most compelling 
is that states act ‘as if’ the Council were an independent body, and in so doing, constitute it as one 
(Searle 1995). While its decision-making procedures are power-based and institutionalize great power 
hierarchy, its resolutions are made in the name of the Council. From a legal perspective, as well, IOs 
carry legal rights and obligations separate from their memberships (d’Aspremont 2007), indicating 
that their legitimacy is independent as well.
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Institutional Design and Founding Legitimacy
The Security Council was designed with three primary goals in mind: to ensure 
control for the victorious ‘great Power’ permanent members, to prevent a rerun of 
the failure of the League of Nations, and to secure some legitimacy in the eyes of 
other UN members. The veto ensured that the organization never took decisions 
that went against the core interests of the great powers (Bosco 2009, 5; Clark 2011, 
169; Hilderbrand 1990, 3; Hurd 2014, 366–67). In this way, the veto system would 
solve the first two problems, but raise complications for the third.
Existing accounts of the Security Council’s founding legitimacy centre on three 
components. First, pivotal to the legitimation of the Council in the eyes of small 
and medium states was its promise, despite its hierarchical structure, to maintain 
international peace and security (Bosco 2009, 35–37; Bourantonis 2005, 6; Hurd 
2007, 89–95; Schlesinger 2003; Simpson 2004, 165–93). The privileges of the P5 
were to be accepted as a sine qua non of an effective organization (Simpson 2004, 
192). This ‘output’ mode of legitimacy is indispensable in that any institution’s 
legitimacy must depend, to some extent, on its capacity to fulfil its goals.
Second, while the presence of non-P5 states on the Council was always a core 
element of its representative legitimacy (Bourantonis 2005, 6), this representation 
was also heavily weighted in favour of states of principal material capabilities 
(Luck 2006, 11). The representation of lesser powers on the Council as non-perma-
nent members was designed primarily to let them ‘blow off steam’, in Anthony 
Eden’s words (Bosco 2009, 15). At the San Francisco conference in 1945, the only 
substantive amendment to the proposed Council was the addition of two crite-
ria for election as rotating members: ‘in the first instance’ contributions towards 
maintaining international peace and security, and, second, equitable geographical 
distribution.14 The outcome of the conference gave little indication that the Secu-
rity Council should in some way ‘represent’ the UN membership generally. Rep-
resentation in this sense played a relatively minor role in the Council’s founding 
legitimacy.
Third, the great powers chose to open their proposed Charter to a public pro-
cess of deliberation with lesser powers at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, 
on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks ‘Proposals’ from the previous year. This 
undoubtedly made it appear more legitimate than if it had been simply imposed 
after the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations amongst the four major allies (Hurd 2007, 
107–8). This deliberation lent the Council at least some semblance of democratic 
approval, despite the Charter adopted being almost identical to what was origi-
nally proposed by the Big Three.
But an account of the Council’s founding legitimacy would remain incomplete 
if it did not take into account two further factors which were practically taken 
for granted at the critical juncture of its founding, but which have subsequently 
become increasingly contested. These are (1) the legitimacy accorded to the allied 
great powers by virtue of their roles in fighting the Second World War, and (2) the 
widespread assumption that an institutional hierarchy favouring the great pow-
ers was a legitimate feature of international society.
14 See United Nations, ‘Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization 
San Francisco: Volume XI. Commission III: Security Council.’ (New York, 1945), p. 106, available at: 
{https://archive.org/details/documentsoftheun008818mbp}, accessed 14 April 2016. This amendment 
is today contained in Article 23 of the UN Charter.
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A large part of the Council’s founding legitimacy derived from the war. All 
along, the Council had its roots in a wartime alliance, in which the ‘big four’ pow-
ers (the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China) were accorded 
special status (Plesch 2008, 144–48). The UN Charter contained references to the 
‘enemy states’ of the UN, and still does. Indeed, the five permanent members were 
not selected based on their perceived capabilities alone. Both France and China 
were added in large part because of their status as major allies in the war, not 
their power capabilities (Bosco 2009, 24–26; Heimann 2015).15 When the General 
Assembly met for the first time in London in January 1946, the legacy of the war 
still dominated discussions, and the Council’s founders repeatedly associated it 
with the defeat of the Axis powers. Prime Minister Clement Attlee of the United 
Kingdom reminded delegates that the UN had its origins in plans made ‘while our 
enemies were still in the field against us’ (A/PV.1, 39),16 while the Soviet delegate 
reflected: 
The United Nations … was created by the same anti-Hitler coalition that was 
headed by the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, which 
bore on their shoulders the brunt of the struggle against our common enemy and 
which were anxious to create an effective international organization for the defense 
of post-war peace and security (A.PV/42, 836; also A/PV.84, 92).
The USSR also justified its support of the Norwegian Foreign Minister for the 
office of President of the General Assembly on the basis of Norway’s ‘resistance to 
the German invaders’ (A/PV.1, 43). Small states also linked the Council and its P5 
members to their roles in winning the war. New Zealand’s representative stated 
that ‘…we, and those who think as we do, recognize and acknowledge at once that 
the great Powers who played the predominant part in winning the war must sim-
ilarly play the predominant part in winning the peace’ (A.PV/39, 785).  Uruguay 
had also earlier circulated a position document conceiving the great powers’ roles 
in the Security Council as a ‘reward’ for their role in the war (Simpson 2004, 171). 
In general, the speeches delivered at the Security Council’s first meeting con-
tained numerous references to its members’ roles in defeating the Axis powers 
(Bosco 2009, 41). To a significant extent, the legitimacy of the Security Council had 
already been prepared at Stalingrad and Normandy.
The legitimacy derived from the war effort was accompanied by a widespread 
belief among states that the great powers—those states with the greatest material 
capabilities—had special rights and responsibilities in international politics. Rec-
ognition was explicitly tied to (material) power (Brown 2004; Bukovansky et al. 
2012; Donnelly 2006). Hierarchy was not foreign to the international system during 
the Council’s founding moment. Sovereign states were accorded superior political 
rights to dominions and colonies; great powers were accorded greater rights and 
responsibilities than lesser sovereign states. International organizations like the 
Council could therefore draw on a degree of stratificatory legitimacy: a conviction 
15 Both Poland and Canada had greater military expenditures in 1946 than France, while China 
spent less than Belgium or Australia, see Correlates of War, ‘Correlates of War: Composite Index of 
National Capability, Version 4.0’ (2012), available at: {http://correlatesofwar.org/COW2 Data/
Capabilities/NMC_v4_0.csv}, accessed 20 January 2015.
16  All UN documents were accessed via the UN Bibliographic Information System, Ubisnet, 
available at: {http://unbisnet.un.org/}, last accessed 14 April 2016.
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that ‘institutionalized inequality in the distribution of primary resources—such as 
power, wealth, and prestige—is essentially right and reasonable’ (Fave 1980, 955).
At the San Francisco conference, the great powers repeatedly ‘emphasized 
the naturalness and inevitability of an unequal international system’ (Hurd 2007, 
101). Of course, the specific extent of great power privilege was hotly contested. 
Many small and medium states were dissatisfied with the broad sweep of the P5’s 
veto power and saw the San Francisco conference as an opportunity to pressure 
the great powers into limiting the veto’s place in the functioning of the Coun-
cil (Hurd 2007, 89–95; Simpson 2004, 165–93). But this dispute ‘mostly concerned 
the detailed implementation of special responsibilities, rather than any object to 
the basic principle itself’ (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 30). According to Ian Hurd, 
proposals by Cuba, Ecuador, and Iran that would have limited the veto even in 
enforcement actions ‘were as unpopular with the rank and file as they were with 
the Great Powers’ (2007, 94 note 37).17 The fundamental concept of great power 
hierarchy, as well as the basic concept of the veto, were largely taken for granted 
(Hurd 2007, 93; Simpson 2004, 170). According to the Chairman of the General 
Assembly, the great powers, ‘by virtue of Articles 24 and 27 of the Charter, and 
by the very nature of things, will shoulder the chief responsibility for the mainte-
nance of peace and security’ (A/PV.1, 38).
To summarize, the Council’s founding legitimacy was based not only on its 
promise to secure international peace and security, the presence of rotating mem-
bers, and deliberative legitimation at the San Francisco conference. It was also 
intimately connected to the legitimating perceptions that the permanent Council 
members had earned their places by fighting the war, and that its hierarchical 
structure simply reflected the inherent rights and privileges of the great powers in 
organizing international affairs. As the following section will show, this founding 
legitimacy may have been effective at this critical juncture, but it would prove 
increasingly problematic in the long run.
Legitimacy Drift
The Security Council is a paradigmatic case of path-dependence in the institu-
tional design of an IO. Entrenched veto players have strongly limited institutional 
adaptation. Initial proposals to ‘index’ the distribution of privilege in the Council 
were rejected outright by the wartime great powers.18 While the Security Council 
remained remarkably static, the world changed rapidly around it. This situation 
had important implications for the Council’s legitimacy.
First, the Council very quickly began to break its promises, eroding the Coun-
cil’s capacity to live up to its initial criteria for legitimacy. The loss of empire ren-
dered Britain and France’s great power statuses increasingly honorific, calling into 
question the legitimacy of the Council’s composition as a great power directorate. 
At the same time, the Council’s inability to act, arising from the paralysis of the 
Cold War, undermined its claim to be able to uphold international peace and secu-
rity through great power cooperation. This weakened the crucial output dimen-
18  Mexico had proposed a system of un-named ‘semi-permanent’ delegates and noted in a 
memorandum that ‘there is no State whose relative international importance fails to suffer with the 
passage of time’ (Simpson 2004:174).
17 For an overview of these and other proposals see Simpson (2004, 180–8).
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sion of its institutional legitimacy (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2004). As Thomas 
Franck (1970, 810) lamented, ‘Almost from the moment the San Francisco Charter 
was signed, this essential prerequisite for U.N. collective enforcement action—the 
unanimity of the great Powers—was seen to be an illusion.’ Many countries began 
to question why they had agreed to the creation of a Council that appeared racked 
by Cold War rivalries.
Second, the Council’s audience shifted. Soon after the Council’s first meeting 
in 1946, the number of sovereign states quickly began to increase. The anti-colonial 
struggles led to the gradual universalization of the principles of self-determina-
tion and sovereign equality, expanding the number of UN members and lead-
ing to new calls from Asian and African states to expand the membership of the 
Council. From the original 51 founding members in 1945, the membership of the 
UN increased to 76 by 1955, and to 117 by 1965, mostly coming from newly inde-
pendent African and Asian states (Bosco 2009, 98). This also upset the Council’s 
geographic apportioning of rotating seats, as new UN members came overwhelm-
ingly from Africa and Asia (Bourantonis 2005, 7–8; Morris 2000, 266). Addition-
ally, many newly independent states had very different legitimacy beliefs, which 
congealed into a North-South conflict at the UN (Malone and Hagman 2002). The 
Security Council had difficulties adapting to these changes in its relevant public.
Third, these changes were also accompanied by shifting standards. The Non-
Aligned Movement became a significant force challenging inequalities and 
stratification amongst the society of states by championing norms of national 
self-determination, racial equality, sovereignty, and democracy. This was accom-
panied by the gradual liquidation of European empires as part of a broader nor-
mative shift that discredited hierarchy and venerated equality as a Grundprinzip 
of nearly all political institutions. This normative shift manifested itself in vari-
ous forms—in the rules that determined who could claim self-determination and 
statehood (liberating colonial peoples), in how domestic political orders were jus-
tified (democracy in liberal or ‘socialist’ variants), and in prevailing cultural val-
ues (reason and equality) (Donnelly 2013; Meyer et al. 1997). Landmarks at the UN 
included the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples (General Assembly Resolution 1514) and the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States (Resolution 2625) (Donnelly 2013, 105). This contrasts strongly with 
the situation that prevailed in 1945, when anti-colonial campaigners failed to have 
an anti-colonial clause inserted into the UN Charter (Bhagavan 2010).19 Just as 
democracy became a way to realize the political equality of individuals, sovereign 
equality of states came to be associated more strongly with equal representation in 
IOs. Democratic pressures also made themselves felt in relation to IOs (Grigorescu 
2015).
The debates about Council reform in the 1960s show evidence of the early 
stages of this normative shift. One indicator is a shift in the diplomatic vocab-
ulary. While, in 1945, UN diplomats debated the privileges and responsibilities 
of the ‘great Powers’ explicitly, by 1963, they had begun to shift towards alterna-
tive terminologies with different connotations. While the term ‘great Power’ was 
19  This echoes Japan’s failure to have an anti-racism clause inserted into the Covenant of the 
League of Nations.
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still widely used in General Assembly debates,20 many speakers chose to refer 
instead to ‘big Powers’,21 ‘major Powers’,22 ‘industrial powers’,23 and ‘nuclear 
Powers’.24 Moreover, speakers associated with the Non-Aligned Movement spoke 
not of great powers but of ‘colonizing Powers’,25 ‘colonial Powers’,26 or even ‘the 
so-called great Powers’.27 In general, international society was becoming less tol-
erant of sovereign inequalities and changing discursive practices reflected this. By 
1965, the permanent members could not avoid Council reform entirely, and four 
more rotating seats were added.
While often taken for granted today, these shifting standards were a debated 
matter of public record at the time. In 1972, the UN Secretary General, Kurt Wald-
heim, reflected upon the meaning of this normative transformation for the Coun-
cil,
Even if the security council were to acquire a new effectiveness through Great Power 
détente, the idea of maintaining peace and security in the world through a concert 
of great powers, although these powers obviously have great responsibilities in 
matters of peace and security, would seem to belong to the nineteenth rather than 
to the twentieth century, where the process of technological advance and democra-
tization is producing a new form of world society (Waldheim 1972, 19).
By the mid-2000s, when Security Council reform had once again resurfaced in 
public debates, the term ‘great Power’ had disappeared completely.28 While 
explicit appeals to great power entitlements were commonplace in the immediate 
post-war period, states today appear reticent to invoke explicit inequalities as a 
legitimate procedural norm. Likewise, the role of member states in the Second 
World War is no longer invoked as a legitimacy claim of the Security Council.29 
At the same time, contemporary debates about Council reform indicate that the 
legitimacy of the Security Council has become increasingly publicly evaluated 
according to democratic principles such as accountability, transparency, and rep-
resentativeness (Binder and Heupel 2015). As organizational sociologists have 
noted, recent decades have witnessed a universal intensification of rationalizing 
pressures associated with concepts of accountability, assessment and transpar-
ency (Bromley and Powell 2012, 484). Representation, in particular, has become so 
central to the legitimation of the contemporary Security Council that it can some-
times function as ‘a proxy for legitimacy’ generally (Lowe et al. 2008, 33).
28 See, for example, the debates of the 59th Session, where the term is never used: A/59/PV.111, 
A/59/PV.112, A/59/PV.114, A/59/PV.115.
29 At least, there is no evidence of it used publicly in recent UN General Assembly debates. See also 
Binder and Heupel (2015).
20 For examples from the 1963 general debate, see inter alia Central Africa Republic (A/PV.1316, 
p. 10), Ghana (A/PV.1285, p. 14), Mexico (A/PV.1239, pp. 1–2), Norway (A/PV.1233, p. 7), Pakistan 
(A/PV.1239, p. 28), Philippines (A/PV.1233, p. 1), Portugal (A/PV.1239, p. 24), Rwanda (A/PV.1235, 
p. 12), and Saudi Arabia (A/PV.1235, p. 7).
21 Yugoslavia (PV.1316, p. 6), Cyprus (A.PV/1235, p. 4).
22 Iraq (A/PV.1239, p. 6), Norway (A/PV.1233, p. 7).
23 Central African Republic (A/PV.1235, p. 8).
24 Central African Republic (A/PV.1235, p. 9), Cyprus (A/PV.1235, p. 1), Iraq (A/PV.1239, p. 6), 
Mexico (A/PV.1239, p. 2), Philippines (A/PV.1233, p. 1), Somalia (A.PV/1237, p. 4), United Arab 
Republic (A/PV/1236, p. 12), Upper Volta (A/PV/1236, p. 14), and Yugoslavia (A/PV.1316, p. 7).
25 Madagascar (A.PV/1236, p. 10),.
26  India (A/PV.1239, p. 12), Indonesia (A/PV.1234, p. 4), Somalia (A.PV/1237, p. 5). But also 
sometimes ‘great colonial Powers’ (Philippines, A/PV.1233, p. 5).
27 Somalia (A/PV.1290, p. 6).
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Responses to Legitimacy Drift
Since the Council has not been comprehensively updated in its seventy-year history, 
and its hierarchical privileges remain in place, how has it maintained legitimacy? 
The Security Council’s internal constituents and external audiences have responded 
to its drifting legitimacy in a variety of ways. Formal institutional reform occurred for 
the first and only time in 1965, increasing the number of rotating seats from six to 
ten. The effect of this expansion on the Council’s activities was unremarkable. Due 
to a combination of vested interests (the P5), veto players (the P5) and inconsist-
encies in legitimacy demands (contradictory demands from the UN membership), 
reform of its formal structures has not occurred since then. For over 50 years, all 
attempts at formal institutional reform of the Council have been famously unsuc-
cessful (for overviews, see Blum 2005; Cox 2009; von Freiesleben 2013).
The Council has been more successful at operational adaptation. It has addressed 
new demands for Council performance regarding new threats, although in the 
absence of formal institutional reform, this has largely been dependent on creative 
reinterpretation of its legal basis (see below). While the formal structure of the 
Council remains largely unchanged, and its original envisaged purpose of con-
fronting acts of international aggression has been only rarely implemented, it has 
embarked on new ventures such as numerous peacekeeping operations  (Lipson 
2007), convening international criminal tribunals (Sandholtz 2008), imposing new 
‘smart’ sanctions (Drezner 2011), and using other diplomatic implements (Luck 
2006, 60–61) to fulfil its mandate of ensuring international peace and security. But 
operational adaptation has not been a silver bullet either. Member states have not 
universally welcomed this expanding Security Council agenda and the raised the 
normative ambitions to which it is assessed (Andreopoulos 2008).
Discretionary prerogatives of the Council have also been exploited to informally 
and provisionally amend its practices, in the absence of institutionalized reform. In 
the case of the Council’s so-called ‘Provisional Rules of Procedure’, these informal 
rules have maintained their ‘provisional’ character since 1946 and have never been 
substantively altered (Security Council Report 2007, 2). Rather, accommodation to 
new legitimacy demands has taken place through the evolution of Security Council 
working methods, which the Charter left up to Council discretion (Hulton 2004; 
Wood 1996). Many of these ad hoc changes have been made in response to new legit-
imacy demands for more ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ in the Council’s activ-
ities, even though normative demands for greater transparency are often regarded 
as conflicting with functional effectiveness (Wood 1996, 154–56). The working 
methods of the Council have been adapted pragmatically, centring on dialogue 
with non-members, consultations and ‘voice’ with troop- and police-contributing 
countries as well as the Secretariat, and informal interactive dialogues with NGOs 
and so-called ‘Arria-formula’ meetings (United Nations Secretariat 2002). Since the 
end of the Cold War, most of the real work began to take place in ‘informal consul-
tations of the whole’, and the trend of less frequent Council voting emerged, with 
those votes that do occur more likely to succeed, as they are often ‘pre-cooked in 
informal consultations’ (Wood 1996, 155–56). These changes have not been wholly 
symbolic. This has allowed the Council to express conformity to new legitimacy 
demands while remaining largely—if not entirely—unchanged.
As re-legitimation through institutional reform has largely been blocked, and 
operational adaptation can only partly alleviate its legitimacy deficit, the Council 
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has witnessed the emergence of other coping mechanisms. Some emerged soon after 
the critical juncture of Council creation.
In reacting to pressures of legitimation while remaining structurally 
unchanged, the Security Council has experienced decoupling from its written rules 
and its actual practices. First, many aspects of the UN Charter have been ignored 
or creatively reinterpreted to facilitate unforeseen forms of institutional adapta-
tion. Already many years ago the UN Charter was described as bearing as little 
resemblance to the modern world as a Magellan map (Franck 1970, 810). Examples 
are numerous. On the procedural side, a standard practice quickly emerged of not 
regarding abstentions or absence by the permanent members as obstacles to the 
adoption of Council resolutions (in contrast to the wording of Article 27 of the UN 
Charter). Departing from the formal rules was found to be functional for organ-
izational practices (Hurd 2014, 371). The Council ignores other anachronisms of 
the UN Charter in practice, including references to ‘enemy states’ (Article 53), the 
(non-existent) armed forces on standby at the Security Council’s disposal (Article 
43), and the inclusion of states that no longer exist (such as the USSR) (Article 23).30 
Additionally, while the Charter provides that ‘a party to a dispute shall abstain 
from voting’ (Article 27), this provision has never been used against a permanent 
member. On the performance legitimacy side of the ledger, the Council’s opera-
tional activities have also been adapted to confront new perceived international 
threats, in a process of increasingly creative interpretation of the Charter and the 
concept of international threats. Council practice, together with advisory opin-
ions of the International Court of Justice, have developed meanings left ‘implicit’ 
in the Charter text, such that human rights violations, civil wars, non-traditional 
armed conflicts, weapons of mass destruction, and the crime of apartheid have 
been identified as threats to international peace and security, and therefore come 
under Council authority (Franck 1970, 810–12, 2006, 600–603; Sato 2001; Welsh and 
Zaum 2013, 80–86). ‘When there is a willingness to make the Charter work in new 
circumstances, the dead hand of text has not, in the past, always barred the way to 
transformative change’ (Franck 2006, 603).
Second, the logic of confidence and good faith has helped repackage ‘legiti-
mated vocabularies’ of Security Council reform talk (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 349; 
Rasche and Gilbert 2015, 242). While explicit appeals to great power entitlements 
were seen as more or less appropriate at the Council’s founding, states today are 
reluctant to invoke explicit inequalities as a legitimate procedural norm, even if 
this is widely understood as a necessary concession to Realpolitik. Thus while ‘great 
Power’ talk has disappeared, ‘global realities’ have become an indirect way of dis-
cussing the correspondence of the Council’s composition with new members of 
the great power club (Clark 2011, 153; Stephen 2015, 780). While debates about the 
Council’s design were framed in terms of the rightful privileges and responsibil-
ities of the ‘great Powers’, today this discussion uses a less direct vocabulary and 
coexists with stronger norms of sovereign equality and democratic decision-mak-
ing. Great power principles that legitimize the Security Council as a ‘directorate 
of the most powerful states’ have to be softened (Müller 2013). Likewise, aspiring 
permanent members carefully frame their arguments in terms that affirm state 
equality; adding new members to the great power club will make the Security 
30 The inheritance by the Russian Federation of the USSR’s Council seat without vote or debate can 
be regarded as a significant case of ‘de facto reform’ (Bourantonis 2005:32–34).
114  Matthew D. Stephen
Council more representative, transparent, effective, participatory, and inclusive 
(Stephen 2015, 780). In this way, international hierarchy can be discussed while 
not being referenced explicitly (Bull 1977, 228–29).
Finally, the Council has also coped with legitimacy drift through promises of 
reform. The prosecution of a protracted and open-ended Security Council ‘reform 
process’ signals acceptance of conformity to new legitimacy demands via the 
promise of a (permanently deferred) institutionalized re-legitimation in the future. 
Beginning in 1979 with the addition of the ‘question of equitable representation on 
and increase in the membership of the Security Council’ to the General Assembly 
agenda, the modern reform process has effectively allowed the Council to signal 
formal commitment to newly strengthened principles of representation, account-
ability and transparency, while engaging in business as usual. Reform processes 
in themselves can operate as ‘a main currency of organizational legitimacy’ 
 (Hanrieder 2015, 2). Promises of reform hold out the prospect of re-legitimation 
sometime in the future. The cost, however, is that the organization’s current struc-
ture is tacitly acknowledged to be illegitimate (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 356). Table 
2 summarizes the argument.
Table 2. Legitimacy Drift and Organizational Responses, The Security Council Case
Legitimacy Drift Organizational Responses
Broken promises Substantive
- Decline in P5’s relative material capabilities Institutional reform
-  Cold War paralysis hobbled institutional 
performance





-  Disappearance of World War Two-based 
legitimacy
- Decline of special status for ‘great Powers’
-  Strengthening of sovereign equality,  
democracy and representation norms
- International criminal tribunals




- UN membership expansion
- Creative reinterpretation of UN Charter
-  Avoidance of formal rules through 
informal innovations
Logic of confidence
-  Implicit agreement to protect Council’s 
basic legitimacy
-  Use of legitimating vocabularies to 
articulate claims indirectly 
Promises of reform
-  Permanently deferred, ritualistic reform 
process
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3. Conclusion
This article has argued for a historical and theoretically eclectic approach to 
institutional legitimacy. While institutions are typically designed with their own 
legitimation in mind, failure to subsequently ‘update’ an institution to changed 
circumstances can engender legitimacy drift. Responses to legitimacy drift 
include re-legitimation through institutional reform and operational adaptation, 
as well as through other coping mechanisms emphasized by sociological insti-
tutionalism. The Security Council exemplifies these processes, while providing 
a vivid illustration of the changing normative structure of international society 
over time. The initial legitimacy of the Security Council was not only intimately 
tied up to perceptions of the great powers’ inherent special rights and responsi-
bilities, but also the legitimacy that the allied great powers accrued in fighting the 
Second World War. While this mixture of legitimation fit the critical juncture of the 
immediate post-war setting, subsequent political developments and normative 
shifts subjected this legitimacy to a process of drift. The audience to which the 
Council must appeal for legitimacy became far larger and more diverse, while the 
Council’s permanent members accounted for a much-diminished share of global 
power capabilities. The elevation of sovereign equality and norms of transpar-
ency, accountability and representation have shifted standards. Since attempts at 
re-legitimation through institutional reform have been blocked, coping mecha-
nisms such as decoupling, the logic of confidence, and promises of reform in the 
future have emerged.
While the Security Council may be a particularly ‘sticky’ institution, and 
thus particularly prone to legitimacy drift, the model developed in this article 
emphasizes the diversity of processes contributing to legitimacy drift. Analogous 
processes may be observed in other IOs. The Bretton Woods institutions are prom-
inent examples whose nature as shareholding institutions with weighted voting 
has also conflicted with the shift towards principles of democracy and sovereign 
equality between states. The Group of Seven industrialized countries (G7) provides 
another example, in which an informal club of like-minded capitalist democracies 
began, over time, to assume competencies that affected all states in the global 
economy, exposing the group to audience shift and new legitimacy demands from 
excluded states to broad social movements and civil society groups. Historicizing 
institutional legitimacy may help explain the legitimation dynamics that other IOs 
face today.
Finally, this article also suggests that developing persuasive and historically 
sensitive accounts of IO legitimacy stands to gain from drawing on insights from 
multiple institutionalist theories. First, scholarship gains a more explicit under-
standing of the origins and causal processes of institutional legitimacy deficits. 
Second, scholars can assemble different theoretical insights into establishing 
persuasive descriptions and explanations of concrete cases. As IOs grow older 
and the global population of IOs increases, the clean assumptions of functional 
design and choice-based regime theory may become less rewarding relative to the 
insights provided by historical and sociological institutionalisms.
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